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Abstract
In this paper, preferences for income redistribution in Switzerland are elicited
through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008. In addition to the
amount of redistribution as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (work-
ing poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, people in ill
health) and nationality of beneﬁciary (Swiss, Western European, others). Willing-
ness to pay for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the
conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. The Prospect of Upward Mobility hy-
pothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Benabou and Ok (2001)] receives partial
empirical support.
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1 Introduction
Politicians and interest groups often claim to know citizens’ preferences with regard to
income redistribution. While the typical right-wing stance is to decry it as excessive, the
left points to pockets of poverty even in rich societies that need to be eradicated through
more redistribution. The economists’ contribution to the debate traditionally has been
to analyze the eﬀects of redistributive policies on employment, output, and growth. This
paper intends to go a step further by measuring citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for
redistribution. Through a Discrete Choice experiment (DCE), it seeks to determine not
only the desired amount of redistribution but also to test several hypotheses concerning
the determinants of this WTP. The data come from a DCE performed in the fall of 2008
and involving 979 Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2 below. One strand relates
the measured amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral factors.
Examples are Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009).
However, the observed amount of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between
demand and supply, with supply governed by a country’s political institutions and pro-
cesses. This classical identiﬁcation problem would have to be addressed in order to make
inference about citizens’ preferences for redistribution. A second strand of research, exem-
pliﬁed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to
measure attitudes towards redistribution. The problem with this approach is its failure to
impose a budget constraint. It therefore cannot predict actual decision making (e.g. voting
at the polls), where citizens take the consequences in terms of their own income and wealth
into account. A third approach seeks to solve this problem through Contingent Valuation
(CV) experiments [see e.g. Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini (2002)]. The weakness
of the CV approach is that it holds all the attributes of the good in question constant,
varying its price only. In the present context, one would want to vary other attributes of
redistribution besides its tax price, viz. its use (for health, old age, etc.) and the type of
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beneﬁciary (foreigner, national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows to measure preferences uncontaminated by supply
inﬂuences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it does so in
a realistic way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all attributes are
allowed to vary.
There are two recent contributions whose methodology is similar to the one adopted in
this paper. One is by Andreoni and Miller (2002), who test the consistency of altruistic
revealed preferences in a dictatorship experiment, varying an implicit price. Their method
of inferring preferences through estimating WTP values is close to this paper. The other
is by Kuhn (2005), who asked Swiss respondents to estimate wages earned by diﬀerent
professions as well as indicated the wages they deemed fair. The diﬀerence between these
two values was then used as an indicator of the demand for redistribution. On average,
preferences were for the wages of high-earning professions such as lawyers, physicians or
federal ministers to be reduced by 10 percent while those of low-income groups, to be
increased by some 5 percent. Interestingly, such a redistributive scheme would roughly
result in budget balance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its ﬁrst part concerns the origin
of the potential beneﬁciaries and the second, income and mobility as determinants of
preferences for redistribution. Section 3 presents a general description of the method of
DCEs as well as the design of the present experiment. The descriptive statistics of the
experiment follow in Section 4, and hypothesis tests, in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes
the results and concludes with implications for public policy.
2 Literature Review and Statement of Hypotheses
This section ﬁrst presents research that deﬁnes the general background of this paper and
then moves on to contributions that lead to a set of speciﬁc hypotheses to be tested.
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2.1 General Determinants of the Demand for Income Redistri-
bution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide
set of factors inﬂuencing preferences that can be categorized as economic, political, and
behavioral determinants. As to the economic determinants, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
empirically analyze the eﬀects of current and future income on the demand for redistribu-
tion in the United States. While low current income bolsters demand, chances for higher
future income reduce it when the tax system is expected to become more progressive. An-
other economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that a preference
for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as demand for insurance by risk-averse
individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their endow-
ment as well as their future position in society [’veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls (1999)], a
positive WTP for an income transfer from more favorable future states to less favorable
ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted as reﬂecting this hypothetical demand
for insurance.
Beck (1994) investigates individual behavior under the ’veil of ignorance’ in an exper-
iment. Placing participants in a hypothetical society with random diﬀerences in income,
represented by lotteries, he derives the desired amount of income redistribution. Individ-
uals indeed display risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme kind implied by the Rawlsian
maximin rule1. Furthermore, they show no preference for income redistribution in excess
of what can be explained by risk aversion.
As to the political determinants, the literature [Persson and Tabellini (2000; 2003);
Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] predicts that proportional repre-
sentation tends towards universal programs beneﬁtting various groups (old-age pensioners,
working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in targeted ”pork barrel” pro-
grams. Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd supporting empirical evidence in that countries
1The Rawlsian maximin rule uses the maximum improvement of the individual with minimum initial
wealth as the sole criterion.
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with proportional representation have GDP shares of government expenditure that ceteris
paribus are 5 percentage points higher than with majority rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al.
(2009) show that there is a weak evidence of a positive correlation between the degree of
proportional representation and the transfer share in GDP in OECD countries. Additional
political determinants of redistribution include two-party vs. multiparty system, presiden-
tial vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs. representative democracy, with two-party
systems, presidential, and direct democracies all predicted to induce less public redistribu-
tion. Switzerland on the one hand has a high degree of proportional representation and a
parliamentary democracy; on the other hand, its extensive direct democratic control might
serve to limit public welfare spending while enforcing eﬃciency in redistribution [cf. Feld
et al. (2007)].
Among the behavioral determinants of income redistribution, beliefs have been at the
center of attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who
develop a model where society’s belief whether eﬀort or luck determines economic success
gives rise to multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria; Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a model
for the emergence and persistence of such collective beliefs. On the empirical side, Fong
(2001) presents evidence in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that beliefs
about the role of luck in determining economic success are an important determinant of the
demand for redistribution. She also considers the eﬀects of incentives. If eﬀort determines
income, then an increased income tax rate causes a loss in output due to its eﬀect on
incentives. This consideration is hypothesized to qualify the link between beliefs and the
demand for redistribution. However, the data fail to support this hypothesis.
Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus
on pension and unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also
perform CV experiments that impose an explicit trade-oﬀ between income and social in-
surance coverage on respondents. They ﬁnd that people oppose an extension of the welfare
state, with conﬂicts between young and old, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders
creating signiﬁcant hurdles to welfare reform.
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2.2 Economic Well-Being and Demand for Income Redistribu-
tion
The standard model of income redistribution, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981), assumes that identical non-
altruistic utility-maximizing individuals are only diﬀerentiated by their income levels and
determine their individually optimal consumption and leisure [RRMR model]. The utility
function of individual 푖 takes the following quasi-linear form [cf. Persson and Tabellini
(2000)],
푢푖(푐푖, 푙푖) = 푐푖 + 푣(푙푖)
where 푐푖 denotes individual consumption, 푙푖 leisure, and 푣(⋅) is an increasing and concave
function. The government pays a lump-sum transfer 푇 to all citizens, which is ﬁnanced by
a linear uniform income tax 휏 . Thus, the household budget constraint takes the form
푐푖 + (1− 휏)푙푖 ≤ (1− 휏)(휔 + 푦푖) + 푇
with 휔 denoting the household’s time endowment and 푦푖 individual productivity
2, dis-
tributed in the population according to a distribution function 퐹 (⋅) with 퐸[푦푖] = 휇 and
Med[푦푖] = 푚 < 휇. Solving the utility maximization problem yields the following optimal
demand for leisure: 푙ˆ푖 = 푣
−1
푙 [1−휏 ], with 푣푙 denoting 푖’s marginal utility of leisure (subscript
푖 dropped for simplicity). The government’s budget constraint reads
푇 ≤ 휏
∫
푦푖
(휔 + 푦푖 − 푙푖)푑퐹 (푦푖).
The utility-maximizing tax rate 휏ˆ푖 for individual 푖 is thus implicitly given by
휏ˆ푖 = (푦푖 − 휇) 푣푙푙[푙ˆ푖[휏ˆ푖]]. (1)
By concavity of 푣(⋅) (푣푙푙 < 0), individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation
and transfers while individuals with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political
2푦푖 can be alternatively interpreted (i) as personal income before tax or (ii) as level of education.
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equilibrium, the majority of voters supports a positive tax rate that corresponds to the
value 휏ˆ푚 = (푚 − 휇) 푣푙푙[푙ˆ푖[휏ˆ푚]] desired by the median voter, whose income is assumed to
be below the mean (which holds for most economies). The model’s prediction is that the
more unequal the income distribution, i.e. the larger the gap between the mean and the
median income, the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) ﬁnd some supporting evidence. Fur-
thermore, Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four
EU countries, shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redis-
tribution. On the other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez
(1999) fail to ﬁnd supporting evidence for this model.
Based on the RRMR model, we can formulate the static Hypothesis 1 relating the
demand for income redistribution to the individual’s current economic well-being, mea-
sured as personal income, level of education, or self-positioning on a social distance scale,
respectively.
Hypothesis 1: The demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) personal income,
(b) educational level,
(c) higher self-positioning on a social distance scale.
2.3 Social Mobility and Demand for Income Redistribution
The idea that attitudes toward public redistribution could be explained by individuals’
mobility was originally introduced by de Tocqueville (1835). More recently, Piketty (1995)
considers a model of learning from income mobility experience and explains persisting
diﬀerences in attitudes towards redistribution. In the long run, those who experienced
upward mobility believe more in eﬀort and demand less redistribution.
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This ”Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis, originally suggested by
Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) as the ’tunnel eﬀect’ and more recently reformulated
by Benabou and Ok (2001), extends the RRMR model by introducing individuals’ expec-
tations, based on their observations regarding the income mobility of others in society.
Thus, upward mobility may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for
income redistribution. The three premises for this result are: (i) future expected income
is a concave function of current income, (ii) individuals are not too risk averse, and (iii)
commitment to an unchanged ﬁscal policy.
In a simpliﬁed version, the Benabou-Ok model can be illustrated by the following two-
period example. Suppose that tomorrow’s income 푦1 is a concave function of today’s income
푦0: 푦1 = 푓(푦0) with 푓
′′(푦) < 0 for all 푦 ∈ [0, 푦max]. Function 푓(⋅) is normalized such that
the individual with the mean income 휇0 today earns the same income tomorrow, 휇0 = 푓 [휇0].
Then agents with current income below average expect a higher income tomorrow while
those above average will expect a decline of income. By concavity of 푓(⋅), total income
gains of the poor are smaller than total losses of the rich. Thus, tomorrow’s average income
휇1 must fall short of today’s average 휇0. Therefore, all individuals with current incomes
in the interval (푓−1(휇1), 휇0) expect their future income to be higher than average 휇1 and
thus oppose redistribution in the next period.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) who, using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people
who expect high future income oppose redistribution. The ’tunnel eﬀect’ also works in
the opposite direction, causing forward-looking agents with high incomes but downward
mobility expectations to be in favor of redistribution. This prediction is conﬁrmed by
Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) using a data set from Russia. Furthermore, Molna´r and
Kapita´ny (2006a; 2006b) show that individuals who lack clear expectations about their
future income favor redistribution even more than those with negative but clear expec-
tations. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use probabilistic expectations data to show that indi-
viduals with a suﬃciently large chance of occupational upward mobility exhibit a lower
demand for redistribution; conversely, those with a suﬃciently large risk of occupational
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downward mobility opt for more redistribution. Checchi and Filippin (2004), testing the
POUM hypothesis by means of a within-subjects experiment, ﬁnd corroborating evidence
under several alternative speciﬁcations.
According to Guillaud (2008), however, individuals who subjectively experienced up-
ward mobility over ten years tend to be more (rather than less) supportive of redistributive
policies. Moreover, upward intergenerational mobility (measured as the diﬀerence in the
job prestige compared to the job of the father) leads to a more positive rather than negative
attitude towards redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) review the theoretical litera-
ture, providing a framework for incorporating various eﬀects that were previously studied
in isolation. They examine the empirical evidence for the United States and brieﬂy across
countries, concluding that social mobility (if measured as the change in the occupational
prestige) does decrease demand for redistribution once sociodemographic (age, gender,
race) and socioeconomic characteristics (income, education) are controlled for.
Based on the POUM hypothesis, we formulate the dynamic Hypothesis 2 relating the
demand for redistribution to various mobility measures, viz. diﬀerence in education be-
tween individuals and their fathers, diﬀerence in the occupational prestige between individ-
uals and their fathers (intergenerational mobility), past income mobility, expected income
mobility, as well as the experienced change in the self-positioning on a social distance scale
(subjective mobility).
Hypothesis 2: The demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) a higher diﬀerence between individuals and their fathers in terms of education,
(b) a higher diﬀerence between individuals and their fathers in terms of occupational
prestige,
(c) higher upward income mobility in the past,
(d) higher upward income mobility in the future,
(e) larger positive change in the self-positioning on a social distance scale.
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3 Discrete Choice Experiments
3.1 Theoretical Foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ prefer-
ences for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction with
classical Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow in-
dividuals to express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products.
During a DCE, respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several
hypothetical alternatives deﬁned by their attributes including their price. By varying the
levels of attributes, diﬀerent product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will
always choose the alternative with the highest utility level. From the observed choices,
the researcher can infer the utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method,
derived from the New Demand Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint
Analysis [Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain
situation or product is described in detail and respondents are asked to indicate their
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for this ﬁxed product. Only its price attribute is
varied, while in Conjoint Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making
it a multi-attribute valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes the
product in less detail than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product varieties
by varying the levels of relevant attributes [cf. Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-
oﬀs among attributes can be explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes
estimated separately (see below). Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less
likely than in CV with its exclusive emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior.
Finally, biases that easily occur when individuals are directly asked about their WTP are
less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan (2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly
impose the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of in-
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come used to ﬁnance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultaneously
choose this share and hence the ’size of the pie’ and the ’slices of the pie’ devoted to dif-
ferent types of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.). Thus, trade-oﬀs among diﬀerent
attributes of the redistribution plan can be calculated to assess the relative importance of
the respective redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974; 1981; 2001)]. Individual 푖 values alter-
native 푗 according to the utility 푉푖푗 attained, which is given by
푉푖푗 = 푣푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖, 휀푖푗). (2)
Here, 푣푖(⋅) denotes 푖’s indirect utility function, 푎푗 , the amount of attributes associated with
alternative 푗, and 푝푗 , price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by 푦푖 and 푠푖, respectively. Finally, 휀푖푗 denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering 푣푖, imparting
a stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split
into a systematic component 푤(⋅) and a stochastic one,
푉푖푗 = 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗.
A utility- maximizing individual 푖 will prefer alternative 푗 to alternative 푙 if and only if
푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗. (3)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability 푃푖푗 of individual 푖 choosing
alternative 푗 rather than alternative 푙 can be estimated, with
푃푖푗 = Prob [푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푙 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) + 휀푖푗 ] (4)
= Prob [휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 ≤ 푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)] . (5)
Thus, the probability of choosing 푗 amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
diﬀerence 푤푖[푗] − 푤푖[푙] dominating the ’noise’, 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 . By the central limit theorem,
the error terms {휀푖푙, 휀푖푗} can be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
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variances 휎2푙 and 휎
2
푗 as well as covariance 휎푙푗 . Under these assumptions, 휑푖푗 := 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 is
also normally distributed with mean zero and variance 휎2 := Var[휑푖푗] = 휎
2
푙 + 휎
2
푗 − 2휎푙푗 .
Thus, equation (5) can be represented as
푃푖푗 = Φ
(
푤푖(푎푗 , 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖)− 푤푖(푎푙, 푝푙, 푦푖, 푠푖)
휎
)
, (6)
where Φ(⋅) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. The model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher, Louviere and Swait
(1999) provide empirical evidence that a linear speciﬁcation of the function 푤(⋅) leads to
good predictions in its middle ranges. Therefore, one posits
푤푖(푎푗, 푝푗, 푦푖, 푠푖) = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘푎푘 + 휀푖푗, (7)
where 푐푖 represents an individual-speciﬁc constant, 푎푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the attributes of
the alternative, and 훽푘, 푘 = 1, . . . , 퐾, are the parameters to be estimated. These parame-
ters can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes.
The marginal rate of substitution between two attributes 푚 and 푛 is given by
MRS푚,푛 = −
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푎푛
. (8)
In the case of a linear utility function, this can be estimated as the ratio of the respective
slope parameters,
MRS푚,푛 = −
훽ˆ푚
훽ˆ푛
,
representing the marginal WTP for an additional unit of 푎푚 expressed in units of 푎푛.
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute 푎푚 can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context,
the income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]3:
MWTP(푎푚) =
∂푣/∂푎푚
∂푣/∂푝푗
. (9)
3By Roy’s Identity, 푥푖푗 = −
∂푣(⋅)/∂푝푗
∂푣(⋅)/∂푦푖
, the (uncompensated) demand of individual 푖 for commodity 푗
corresponds to the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to price
푝푗 and income 푦푖. If one alternative is chosen, then the optimal quantity demanded is equal to one, i.e.
푥푖푗 = 1. Therefore, Roy’s Identity yields
∂푣
∂푦푖
= − ∂푣
∂푝푗
, i.e. the marginal utility of income is equal to the
negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price.
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By limiting the speciﬁcation to the product attributes only (simple model, cf. Section 5.1),
one obtains the following expression representing the diﬀerence in utility of individual 푖
between alternative 푗 and status quo,
Δ푉푖푗 = 푐푖 +
퐾∑
푘=1
훽푘푎푘 + 훽푝푝푗 + 휑푖푗, (10)
where 푐푖 = 푐푖푙 − 푐푖푗 and 휑푖푗 = 휀푖푙 − 휀푖푗 for each 푗 ∕= 푙. This simple model suﬃces to test
Hypothesis 1 (see Section 5.2.1).
For econometric inference, it is important to take into account that the same individual
makes several choices. The two-way random-eﬀect speciﬁcation takes this into account
with 휑푖푗 = 휇푖+휂푖푗, where 휇푖 denotes the component that varies only across individuals but
not across the choice alternatives. The terms 휇푖 and 휂푖푗 are assumed uncorrelated with the
product attributes (푎푖1, . . . , 푎푖퐾) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a
probit model, 휎휂 = 1. Hence Var[휑푖푗 ] = 휎
2
휂+휎
2
휇 = 1+휎
2
휇 and Corr[휑푖푗, 휑푖푙] =
휎2휇
1+휎2휇
=: 휌. The
parameter 휌 indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated
with each other, or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by
individual-speciﬁc error term. The random-eﬀects speciﬁcation is justiﬁed if 휌 is high and
signiﬁcant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g.
income group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted
with the product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model
speciﬁcation which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses
1 and 2, cf. Section 5.2. By means of a 푡 test we can investigate whether the diﬀerences in
marginal WTP values between diﬀerent socioeconomic groups are statistically signiﬁcant.
The computation of the variance of the marginal WTP values can be performed by the
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delta method, cf. Hole (2007)4.
3.2 Experimental Design
In order to elicit the preferences of Swiss citizens for income redistribution, a representative
telephone survey with 979 respondents was conducted in the fall of 2008. Prior to the
telephone survey, the attributes and their levels used to deﬁne ’income redistribution’ had
been checked in two pretests for their relevance. They form four groups (see Table 1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on ﬁve types of recipients, viz.
the working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and ill
people);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on three groups, viz. Swiss
citizens, western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, deﬁned as a share of GDP;
4. Share of personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible sce-
narios that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios deﬁne the 푛 rows of the
observation matrix 푋 , with associated covariance matrix Ω = 휎2 (푋 ′푋)−1 of parameters 훽
to be estimated.
So-called 퐷-eﬃcient design calls for the minimization of the geometric mean of the
eigenvalues of Ω,
퐷 eﬃciency =
(
∣Ω∣
1
퐾
)
−1
4The estimate of the variance is given by
Var
[
−
훽ˆ푘
훽ˆ푝
]
=
⎡
⎣∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푘
⎤
⎦
2
Var[훽ˆ푘] +
⎡
⎣∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푝
⎤
⎦
2
Var[훽ˆ푝]− 2
∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푘
∂
(
−훽ˆ푘/훽ˆ푝
)
∂훽ˆ푝
Cov[훽ˆ푘, 훽ˆ푝]
=
1
훽ˆ2푝
Var[훽ˆ푘] +
훽ˆ2푘
훽ˆ4푝
Var[훽ˆ푝] + 2
훽ˆ푘
훽ˆ3푝
Cov[훽ˆ푘, 훽ˆ푝]
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
∙ Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
∙ Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
∙ Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
∙ Ill People ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of beneﬁts going to
∙ Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
∙ Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
∙ Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
where 퐾 denotes the number of parameters to estimate [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the num-
ber of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split in ﬁve groups. One alternative
was included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices
per respondent.
In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set
and made in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the
attributes and their possible realizations. The appendix shows the graphical representation
of the status quo and two selected alternatives.
4 Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-
speaking part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent
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are born in the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income be-
low CHF 2,000 and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reﬂecting the structure of the Swiss
population. However, only 1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
42.6 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, ’By increasing the income
tax rates for rich families and ﬁnancially supporting poor families, the government should
try to reduce the income gap between rich and poor.’ while 54.6 percent disagreed. On the
other hand, 36 percent of the respondents stated that the current level of social beneﬁts
was too low, 9 percent stated that it was too high, and 48.7 percent found it exactly right.
Current 5 years ago In 5 years
Income classes, CHF No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
< CHF 2000 192 20 236 25 135 14
CHF 2000 - 3999 193 20 189 20 187 20
CHF 4000 - 5999 344 36 300 32 349 37
≥CHF 6000 221 23 223 23 264 28
Total valid answers 950 100 948 100 935 100
Missing 29 31 44
Sample 979 979 979
Table 2: Current, past, and future expected individual incomes, per month (in CHF)
The frequency distributions of current, past, and expected future incomes are shown in
Table 2. Note that incomes <CHF 2000, CHF 2000-3999, and ≥CHF 6000 approximately
correspond to the ﬁrst, second, and ﬁfth income quintiles whereas the bracket CHF 4000-
5999 contains the third and the fourth quintiles. From the individual responses entered in
Table 2, transition probabilities between the income quintiles can be estimated (which are
not available from oﬃcial Swiss statistics).
Table 3 shows the frequency distributions of the respondents’ own as well as their
fathers’ educational levels.
Table 4 contains the frequency distribution of the diﬀerences between the respondents’
and fathers’ educational levels, which will be referred to as DIFF ED, as well as the
distribution of answers to the question, ’Is there a diﬀerence in occupational prestige in
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the society between your job and your father’s job?’, later referred to as (DIFF PREST).
This is an indicator of subjective intergenerational mobility INTERG MOB SUBJ).
Table 5 shows the current and future expected self-positioning of respondents on a
social distance scale. Using these two variables, one can determine the distribution of the
subjectively expected social mobility to occur within a generation.
Respondents Fathers
Educational level No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Less than high school 654 67 670 69
High school 195 20 185 19
College and more 129 13 111 11
Total valid answers 978 100 966 100
Missing 1 13
Sample 979 979
Table 3: Respondents’ and fathers’ educational levels
Education Occupational prestige
Diﬀerence No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Positive 194 20 331 35
No diﬀerence 600 62 361 38
Negative 172 18 138 15
Total valid answers 966 100 944 100
Missing 13 35
Sample 979 979
Table 4: Diﬀerence in education and occupational prestige between respondents and fathers
4.2 Respondents’ Choice Behavior
There is a total of 979 ⋅8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which almost 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo (see Table 6). There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes
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Current In 5 years
Social class No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Lowest (1) to 3 201 21 138 14
Class 4 405 42 361 38
Class 5 270 28 331 34
6 to highest (9) 98 10 134 14
total valid answers 974 100 964 100
missing 5 15
sample 979 979
Table 5: Self-positioning on a social distance scale, current and in 5 years
in the experiment may not have been suﬃciently extreme to make respondents switch.
Second, some attributes (e.g. beneﬁts going to the unemployed; see Table 8), may not have
been suﬃciently valued to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making
because the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However,
there may simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making
situations (see the large negative constant in Table 8). Nonetheless, only 21 percent of
respondents never opted for an alternative (see Table 6). Conversely, almost 80 percent
departed from the status quo at least once.
Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 6: Total number of choices
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# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 7: Distribution of the numbers of chosen alternatives per respondent
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Simple Model: Product Attributes Only
Estimation of equation (10) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of the
indirect utility function. Moreover, it has to take into account that uses and types of
beneﬁciaries add up to 100 percent (see Table 1). In order to avoid perfect collinearity,
PENS (Pensioners) and OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
Δ푉 = 푐0 + 훽1W POOR+ 훽2UNEMP+ 훽3ILL + 훽4FAM+
+훾1SWISS + 훾2WEU FOR+ (11)
+훿1REDIST+ 훿2REDIST
2 + 휂TAX + 휑
Estimation of a few of the 5 ⋅ 3 = 15 speciﬁcations with alternative exclusions produced
results similar to those displayed in Table 8. Speciﬁcally, they agree in that additional
redistribution causes respondents to opt for the alternative with a lower probability, which
is even more true of an increase in the income tax to ﬁnance it [for the inﬂuence of its
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Variable Coeﬀ. Std. err. 푧 푃 > ∣푧∣ Marg. eﬀ.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
휒2(0) 108.87
Prob > 휒2 0.000
휎푢 0.41610
휌 0.14759
Table 8: Random eﬀects probit estimates for the simple model
composition, see Neustadt and Zweifel (2009)]. Moreover, the negative constant points
to a strong status quo bias. By eq. (9), the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for
redistribution is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂Δ푉/∂REDIST
∂Δ푉/∂TAX
= −
훿1 + 2훿2REDIST
휂
(12)
Thus, one obtains an estimated MWTP value of -0.25 percentage points of income share
per additional percentage point of GDP devoted to redistribution, in excess of the status
quo. Evaluated at the mean personal income of the sample, this amounts to CHF -11.78
per month. However, this ﬁgure is dwarfed by the compensation one would have to pay
respondents to depart from the status quo, amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their
monthly income, or 5.27 percent of their annual income.
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5.2 Extended Model: Preference Heterogeneity
5.2.1 Economic Well-Being and Preferences for Redistribution
Here, the simple model is extended by including one of the socioeconomic variables at a
time (personal income, education, self-positioning on a social distance scale) as well as its
interactions with the attributes. Thus, in the case of income, e.g., eq. (12) is modiﬁed to
read5,
Δ푉 = 푐0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푐
′
0INC+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훽1REDIST+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훽
′
1REDIST ⋅ INC+ . . .
Variable MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF Std. err., CHF
Income group 1 (low) -1.14215 -11.42 6.08 ***
Income group 2 -0.64081 -19.22 9.37 ***
Income group 3 -0.43293 -21.65 9.83 ***
Income group 4 (high) 0.02117 1.81 13.47
No high school -0.62526 -25.13 7.12 **
High school, no college -0.08911 -4.58 7.70 **
College 0.01501 1.04 14.71
Social group 1 (low) -0.40762 -14.72 8.49 ***
Social group 2 -0.65405 -28.45 8.81 ***
Social group 3 -0.30303 -15.06 12.36 *
Social group 4 (high) 0.25550 17.61 11.01 *
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
Table 9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with measures of economic well-being
Hypothesis 1 states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
higher values of (a) income, (b) education, and (c) social status. Hypothesis 1(a), with
its focus on personal income, cannot be conﬁrmed (see Table 9). In fact, MWTP for
5The full speciﬁcation is available from authors on request. The relevant results are shown in Table 9.
21
redistribution as a percentage of income is most strongly negative in the lowest income
group and consistently increases up to the second-highest. In terms of CHF amounts,
negative MWTP values reach a maximum among the middle groups No. 2 and 3. However,
the diﬀerences in MWTP values between Income Groups 1 and 2 (푡 = 0.65) as well as
between Income Groups 2 and 3 (푡 = 0.75) are not signiﬁcant. Still, diﬀerences in MWTP
values within all other pairs of groups are shown to be signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level
(with the exception of the diﬀerence between Income Groups 1 and 3 being signiﬁcant at
the 90 percent level).
Similarly, Hypothesis 1(b) ﬁnds no empirical support, with MWTP values increasing
rather than decreasing with higher levels of education. The evidence is mixed concerning
Hypothesis 1(c) since resistance against redistribution seems to increase from the lowest to
group No. 2 of the social self-positioning scale. However, the diﬀerence between Groups 1
and 2 is only weakly signiﬁcant (푡 = −1.20).
5.2.2 Social Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution
This time, the simple model is extended to include (besides the control variables respon-
dent’s education, father’s education, personal income, self-positioning on a social distance
scale) one of the following mobility measures: (a) intergenerational mobility in education
(DIFF ED), (b) intergenerational mobility in occupational prestige, (c) income mobil-
ity in the past, (d) expected income mobility in the future, or (e) the change in the
self-positioning on a social distance scale. Therefore, in the case of the intergenerational
mobility in education, eq. (12) is modiﬁed to become
Δ푉 = 푐0 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 푐
′
0DIFF ED+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훽1REDIST+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 훽
′
1REDIST ⋅DIFF ED+ . . .
Hypothesis 2 states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with upward
income or social mobility. In its version 2(a), it is rejected because negative MWTP is
maximum among participants whose educational level is lower than their fathers’, with the
diﬀerences with the other two groups being highly signiﬁcant (see Table 10). Hypothesis
2(b), with its focus on mobility in occupational prestige, ﬁnds partial support in that
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Variable MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF Std. err., CHF Test
Downward mobility in education -1.57572 -6.26 3.50 2a:
No mobility in education -0.23996 -1.06 0.53 R
Upward mobility in education -0.32110 -1.84 1.11
Downward mobility in prestige 0.39446 1.62 1.00 2b:
No mobility in prestige -0.38294 -1.84 1.12 (C)
Upward mobility in prestige -0.09002 -0.51 1.22
Downward past income mobility -0.13457 -0.60 1.29 2c:
No past income mobility -0.58353 -2.49 0.69 (C)
Upward past income mobility -0.08165 -0.49 1.38
Downward expected income mobility 0.10437 0.83 1.79 2d:
No expected income mobility -0.55952 -2.60 0.73 (C)
Upward expected income mobility -0.20783 -0.76 0.83
Downward social mobility -0.18929 -0.84 0.68 2e:
No social mobility -0.54176 -2.52 0.75 (C)
Upward social mobility 0.14992 0.77 1.76
Note: (C)=partially conﬁrmed, R=rejected
Table 10: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with mobility measures
the MWTP of respondents with downward mobility is positive, and, the others, negative.
Similarly, Hypothesis 2(c) can be accepted only to the extent that citizens with downward
income mobility in the past exhibit the least resistance against redistribution. As to
Hypothesis 2(d), there are weak signs suggesting that citizens with downward expected
income mobility in the future might have a positive MWTP, in contrast to those with
no mobility expectations. But statistical signiﬁcance of two of three MWTP values is
lacking to begin with, amounting to partial conﬁrmation of Hypothesis 2(d) only. Finally,
Hypothesis 2(e) is merely conﬁrmed to the extent that individuals with downward social
mobility exhibit a higher MWTP than those with no social mobility, with the corresponding
푡 value suggesting statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in MWTP values.
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The one consistent pattern seems to be the following. In four out of ﬁve cases (except
mobility in education), citizens with no past or future expected mobility display the highest
negative MWTP values both in terms of a share in their income and in absolute amount.
This seems to point to risk aversion in the face of the ’veil of ignorance’ [Beck (1994)];
however, this argument has been traditionally used to predict positive rather than the
observed negative MWTP for income redistribution. On the other hand, risk aversion
constitutes one of the main explanations of status quo bias (see Section 5.1). Therefore, this
DCE seems to suggest that Swiss citizens, while markedly risk averse, do not believe income
redistribution organized by the government to be an eﬀective means of protection against
the risk impinging on their economic and social status, with the one exception of education
(which is predominantly public in Switzerland). Such an attitude could be justiﬁably
called realistic for citizens of a small country whose economic fortune has depended on
developments abroad for decades if not centuries.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay for redistribution through a Discrete
Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on the simple model that relates choices to the
attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen must be paid a compensation of
CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.02 percent of annual income) for an additional
percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In addition, a very marked
status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another 5.27 percent of annual
income.
However, such an experiment also permits to test several hypotheses concerning the
determinants of the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side inﬂu-
ences. By including one of three measures of current economic well-being at a time, the
extended model allows us to test static Hypothesis 1, stating that demand for redistribu-
tion decreases with income. However, it is found to increase with level of education and
(in part) with personal income as well as higher self-positioning on a social scale.
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With the inclusion of ﬁve measures of social mobility, dynamic Hypothesis 2 (POUM)
could be tested as well. Except for mobility in education, citizens with no mobility at all
display the highest resistance against redistribution, contrary to POUM but underscoring
the importance of status quo bias.
The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, only purely
economic explanations of demand for redistribution (income, social mobility) were tested.
However, recent contributions to the ﬁeld show that up to 90 percent of cross-country
diﬀerences in public spending can be related to institutional and behavioral factors [see e.g.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Akkoyunlu et al. (2009)]. Thus, future work should be devoted
to an analysis of behavioral determinants of stated willingness to pay for redistribution.
Second, the status quo bias found in this paper calls for more detailed analysis. To the
extent that it reﬂects risk aversion, it should induce demand for redistribution - contrary
to the results presented here. Finally, the evidence only relates to a point of time and thus
may be subject to transitory shocks. Still, by appealing to citizens’ stated preferences, the
present contribution sheds some light on the debate between those who claim that there is
excess redistribution and those who claim there is too little.
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Status Quo
(current state of redistribution) 
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
in ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Alternative 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people in ill 
health
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Alternative 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people in 
ill health 
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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